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Abstract  
 
The evolution to dominance of neoclassical economics is reviewed in light of Marcuse’s One-
Dimensional Man in the wake of the fiftieth anniversary of the classic’s first publication. 
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Introduction  
 
Both the economy and economics offer extraordinarily fertile ground for the hypothesis of 
the one-dimensional nature of contemporary capitalism. For the economy, a seductive 
starting point is Oscar Wilde’s quip in Lady Windermere’s Fan: 
“What is a cynic? A man who knows the price of everything and the value of 
nothing.” 
Less observed is that Wilde continues that not just market value, but use values are 
susceptible to being reduced to a one-dimensional, if absurd, sentimentalism: 
And a sentimentalist … is a man who sees an absurd value in everything, and doesn't 
know the market price of any single thing. 
Such is an elementary play on the dialectic between use value and exchange value. It will be 
taken up in the first section, with the commodity serving as major point of critical departure 
from the dualism between cynicism and sentimentalism. From there, a journey will be taken 
in subsections through more abstract notions of the commodity, the commodity form and 
commodity calculation to their contemporary attachments to financialisation and 
neoliberalism. 
Further, as addressed in the second major section, the dismal science of (mainstream) 
economics, so dubbed by the reactionary Thomas Carlyle for its reliance upon supply and 
demand and failure to distinguish classes and the roles they should play (allowing slavery, 
perversely, if it were but freely imposed), is renowned for its lack of dimensions. Mainstream 
economics has, along with many other terms of abuse, been characterised as 
monoeconomics.1 The exact nature of this dimensionlessness will be explored in subsections 
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marking the passage from the marginalist revolution of the 1870s to the freakonomics of the 
present day, demonstrating its elusive attachment to the economy it purports to examine. 
Across each of these narratives, the idea that the economy and economics are becoming 
confined to a single dimension is firmly rejected, as if attached to some sort of 
McDonaldisation and/or globalisation thesis.2 Rather, Marcuse’s notion of one-dimensional 
man is appropriately very different, in application to both the society of his time and the 
scholarships that it spawned. For the world is perceived to be subject to contradictions, whose 
underlying tensions are merely addressed at superficial levels, in theory and in practice, in 
seeking to flatten determinants to forms and to shift between one form and another rather 
than to reveal and resolve their underlying tensions. Such is most obvious in the dialectic 
between spiralling consumer needs and the inability of their fulfilment to generate 
satisfaction. But this is by no means the sole nor the most important reduction to single 
dimensions as evidenced by Marcuse’s wide-ranging critique albeit one that could hardly be 
expected to have anticipated the syndrome in the context of today’s specific financialised 
neoliberalism. 
On a more personal and indulgent note, I read One-Dimensional Man as an ingénue Marxist 
student in the early 1970s, and I revisited it in researching consumption in the early 1990s (in 
which I was highly critical more generally of the idea of consumer society).3 In returning to 
the text once more for this article, I find myself more favourably inclined, at least to its more 
general thesis of one-dimensional man, and have taken the opportunity to review my own 
ideas about the economy and economics through the prism of what I prefer to call one-
dimensions, rather than one-dimensional, as this seems to capture Marcuse’s thrust more 
accurately against popular interpretations of capitalism (and neoliberalism, globalisation and 
financialisation, see below) as homogenisingly uniform. This has, though, meant an undue 
degree of referencing to my own work for more detailed discussion of the arguments offered. 
But, in short, I interpret Marcuse as projecting, however successfully against resistance, a 
flattening of both material and cultural worlds, rather than that the latter are rendered 
unilinear. This offers a powerful prism through which to view the contemporary economy 
and the orthodox, mainstream, neoclassical economics it has spawned, as opposed to 
marginalised heterodoxies including Marxist political economy that continue to view 
capitalism in systemic and dialectical terms, respectively.  
 
The Economy 
From Commodity Fetishism … 
The most general expression of the one-dimensional nature of capitalism is money. But 
money itself is a complex thing, with many dimensions, each of which has its own 
dimensions. First, not least as observed by Marx in the opening chapters of Capital, money is 
itself a commodity, a general equivalent to all other commodities through which they express 
their value in price form. As a result, the use value of the commodity is reduced to the single 
dimension of price. Moreover, as highlighted by Marx through the notion of commodity 
fetishism, the relations between producers are expressed as, or reduced to, a monetary 
relationship. How much does this thing cost to buy?  
Marx’s purpose is to uncover the class relations of production that underpin not so much the 
origins of the commodity as the basis on which it can be attached to the production and 
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realisation of profit. The vast majority of the three volumes of Capital are concerned with 
how surplus value is produced, distributed and realised and with what consequences, issues 
which remain controversial in interpretation but at the heart of Marxist political economy. 
The purpose here though is to emphasise a different feature of commodity fetishism and its 
reduction of dimensions. For it is but a simple step from seeing it in terms of the concealment 
of the class relations of production to embracing a comparable fetishism of all aspects, or 
dimensions, of social relations. Not only class relations (themselves in the narrow sense of 
who produces what, for whom under what working conditions) but also, for example, gender 
and environmental relations are concealed by commodity fetishism – or at least to the extent 
that they are not part and parcel of immediately observable use value. For, just as there is no 
mistaking gas-guzzling vehicles or the gendered nature of many products, these do not reveal 
the corresponding relations under which they have been produced (leading, for example, to 
attempts to uncover them as with carbon footprints). 
Indirectly, such an extension of how commodity fetishism is conceived sheds some light on 
one of the few aspects of the capitalist economy that drew Marcuse’s close attention in One-
Dimensional Man, the one-dimensional freedom of choice that can be exercised over an ever-
expanding domain of false, generated and even repressive needs. In the wake of a postmodern 
world, that needs might be false raises some serious issues of interpretations given that all 
needs, including the “true” and even those essential to minimal survival, are unavoidably 
socially constructed in their content and meaning. But, as I have argued at great length and 
with many examples in the system of provision approach to the material culture of 
consumption,4 how such needs are generated and fulfilled (or not) is highly contingent upon 
the social relations under which they are provided but which are concealed. What you are 
wearing is child labour, what you are driving is environmental degradation, and so on just as 
much as they are the height of fashion and symbol of masculinity. The one-dimensional 
nature of consumption is its capacity to conceal as much as it is to promote, and it is a 
consequence of the money form taken by the commodity as the means to access 
consumption. All I need to know is what I want and have the money to get it. 
… Through Commodity Form and Calculation … 
But money does not simply constitute a means of payment for accessing commodities, it also 
creates a standard, literally a dimension, for activity and evaluation even where commodities 
as such are not involved. We think and act in money terms even where money is not present, 
or at least is not in use in paying for a commodity, thereby at least indirectly and informally 
endowing the non-monetary with a monetary dimensions. In other words, the scope of money 
is very much wider than the world of commodities. The presence of money in the absence of 
commodities can take two forms. On the one hand, there is where money is, indeed, paid for 
whatever purpose but through which corresponding non-commodity activity and relations are 
mediated. An obvious example is bribery or corruption, or simply the more mundane 
payment of pocket money. Possibly, the most prominent example is social security where, for 
example, the impoverished or the unemployed are reduced to the dimension of state 
beneficiary, with their entitlements contingent on consideration of their personal 
circumstances as opposed to the systemic factors underpinning their plight. As it were, the 
price of unemployment is reduced to the payment of money by way of compensation for lack 
of a job but it can hardly be considered a commodity – and the causes and nature of such 
unemployment, either individually or collectively, are concealed rather than revealed by such 
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one-dimensional payments, at a level inevitably less than one-dimensionally equivalent to a 
wage. 
On the other hand to the one-dimensional presence of money in the absence of the 
commodity, there is what might be termed monetary or commodity calculation where money 
is not directly involved but is used as a measure for evaluation. This, in other words, is where 
the cynic who knows the price of everything joins hands with the sentimentalist who sees the 
worth in everything. That worth can be translated into a price. I could save money by doing 
this myself, or even value life itself in terms of whether the state should fund various forms of 
healthcare, etc. Cost-benefit analysis is such calculation par excellence and is the reduction of 
all considered aspects of life to the single dimension of money. 
… To Money as Capital and Financialisation 
Because of their attachment to money, commodities, commodity forms and commodity 
calculations all have the potential to one-dimension both economic and social life. Further, 
capitalism has a tendency not only to expand the realms of the commodity, commodity form 
and commodity calculation (at the expense of the “sentimental”) but also to transform one to 
the other. Commodification, in particular, is powerfully prompted by the expansion of 
capitalist production into new, or recaptured areas as with the spread of commerce and 
capitalism historically and privatisation of nationalised industries and public services in more 
recent times. In this respect, the one-dimensional nature of money endows it with a second 
dimension, the role of money as capital rather than simply as means of payment (and, in 
addition, as store of value). As a result, money goes beyond facilitating sale and purchase 
and, equally, is borrowed and lent for the one-dimensional process of self-expansion, more of 
the same thing, money. But, whilst the borrower seeks that expansion through some other 
commercial activity such as production in pursuit of profit, the lender takes a share of this 
surplus, expanding the initial advance of money merely by virtue of ownership of what has 
been lent which is expected to be returned with interest, dividends or the like. 
But this distinction between money as money (or simply buying and selling on credit which 
adds no new value but merely redistributes it) and money as capital (in pursuit of added 
value) is of no significance as such to those lending the money unless it is deemed to affect 
the security of their asset and its anticipated return. Indeed, the paper value of the asset, like 
the monetary value of the commodity, as the discounted value of the stream of anticipated 
returns, is oblivious to the processes by which it is generated. In other words, the separation 
between money as money as money as capital is rendered one-dimensional in the forms it 
assumes. 
This is apparent in the formation of what Marx calls fictitious capital.5 For all claims on 
future revenue, however generated, can be securitised and constitute an asset with a paper 
value. Irrespective of how the returns are to be generated (and not depending necessarily or 
usually on fictional, deceitful activity), fictitious capital can be constituted as a paper asset 
and be bought and sold independently of the original ownership let alone the putative source 
of its value. As a result, the differences in the forms and functions of money are highly fluid 
in relationship to one another. Across their different dimensions they are interchangeable 
precisely because their deep but hidden roots, both individually and systemically, in 
economic and social structures, processes, relations and agents are unrevealed much as 
exchange value reveals so little of value relations. As someone put it to me in terms of the US 
subprime crisis, there are houses out there, no doubt they have a value as the basis on which 
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corresponding mortgages have been bought and sold, but the underlying houses are valued as 
if seen through a TV screen in which most of the pixels are no longer working! 
Not surprisingly, such fetishisms are sharply if partially revealed in an economic crisis, when 
the  transformation of just some portion of money capital into its alter ego, money as such -  
through the failure of the economy to be able to realise anticipated returns, as with US 
subprime - leads to a domino effect across corresponding fictitious capital as a whole. 
Everyone wants their money back at whatever price and at the expense of no longer 
dedicating it to continuing economic activity, with recession resulting as the value of 
fictitious capital is individually pursued at collective expense.  
But, not least since One-Dimensional Man was first published, the growth in fictitious capital 
has been prodigious. Over the last thirty years, the ratio of such assets to GDP at a global 
level, with the USA and the UK in the lead, has gone up by three times. In other words, it 
takes three times as much finance to make something (including financial services themselves 
which used previously to be considered as not contributing to GDP6) than it did previously. If 
this were true of anything else, across both raw material and labour, it would be considered 
disastrous – as, indeed, it has been.  
Over the past decade, this growth in fictitious capital has been analysed from a number of 
different perspectives, across the social sciences and heterodox economics if not the 
mainstream (see below), under the newly emerged concept of “financialisation”.7 In many 
instances, this amounts to little more than, unsurprisingly, observing the presence and effects 
of more finance in our economic and social (everyday) lives. Equally unsurprisingly, 
financialisation is shown to be dysfunctional and detrimental especially in the wake and 
through the prism of the global crisis. Particularly prominent has been the idea that 
financialisation exploits us all,8 although this is an undue extrapolation from the idea that it is 
associated with lower real wages, high unemployment, austerity and cuts and privatisation in 
social services, and credit card abuse to sustain norms of consumption (as opposed to 
imperatives driven from above and trickling down in these forms to the most disadvantaged).  
I take a different view in some respects. First is that financialisation of everyday life is not 
best seen as driven by the disadvantaged. On the contrary, such is driven by those who are 
better off and, to a large degree, by those whose status is consolidated by financialisation. 
This is true of those who own housing in a bubble as their asset appreciates (and they still 
own it after the bubble bursts) as opposed to those, potentially a significant minority, who are 
driven to sell their homes as a result of mortgage default. This, though, is not to deny that 
financialisation is associated with growing inequalities, with the more general policies and 
forms of governance attached to neoliberalism, and with more and more sources of what 
might be termed variegated vulnerabilities to impoverishment.  
Rather, second, this is indicative of the expansion of finance into ever more areas of 
economic and social reproduction. This takes two forms, the intensive and the extensive. The 
former is longstanding within the functioning of capitalism, involving the use of fictitious 
capital in the processes of capital accumulation although its expansion and diversity have 
become prodigious as indicated by the proliferation of acronyms through which financial 
assets have been denominated (with corresponding sets of grades by rating agencies, once 
more representing the reduction of social relations of production or, more exactly, profiting to 
a single dimension).  
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However, the extensive form of financialisation, as previously mentioned, involves the 
penetration of finance into ever more areas of economic and social life, not least with 
privatisation and commercialisation of social provision, most notably in housing finance and 
pensions. But the important point here is less or, more exactly, not only who gains and loses 
in this process but also that the nature of the way in which provision takes place has been 
transformed. This is most obvious in case of the difference between a public and a private 
health system, in which the fees from the latter are also bundled up into a fictitious asset for 
the purposes of financial dealing.  
More specifically, consider the example of the privatised UK water industry.9 Household 
charges provide a steady stream of revenue for the companies involved as long as certain 
regulatory standards are met. Allowable costs include interest charges on financing for long-
term investment alongside dividends and executive salaries all of which have ballooned, 
whilst the prospective revenues and guaranteed profits (too wet to fail as it were) have been 
incorporated into a pyramid of globally organised holding companies whose ultimate 
pinnacle are to be found in locations such as the Cayman Islands. Are the customers turning 
the tap on at home or in a tax haven? 
Such is the one-dimensional nature of the financialised economy. It is not simply that 
consumers are enabled and induced to chase an ever-expanding target of unfulfilled needs 
(and do not forget the emergence of “falsely” needed bottled waters alongside household 
supply). Nor is there merely the alienation of work and the worker across a variety of 
dimensions that are reduced to contribution to surplus production and appropriation. Nor is it 
confined to the reduction of water and, correspondingly, nature to the one dimension of 
private property (who owns the clouds?). Nor is it just the reduction of a basic human need to 
the ability to pay. Rather, it is all of these together with their incorporation into the one-
dimensional domain of fictitious capital, literally as well as geographically far removed from, 
but still attached to, a fetishised water system. 
It is understandable that Marcuse should not have addressed a prospective financialisation in 
One-Dimensional Man, and his account of economic issues there is limited and primarily 
focused upon the consumer and the dialectic of needs, p. 246: 
The creation of repressive needs has long since become part of socially necessary 
labor – necessary in the sense that without it, the established mode of production 
could not be sustained. Neither problems of psychology nor of aesthetics are at stake, 
but, the material basis of domination. 
Even so, there are other aspects of the passage from production to consumption that could 
have drawn his attention and been deployed to demonstrate his one-dimensional thesis. 
Significantly, whilst clearly influenced by the thesis of hidden persuaders, and affluent and 
consumer society, he does not seem to be attracted to the monopoly capital school’s 
understanding of the USA as subject to underconsumptionist stagnation.10  
This is illustrative of the context in which One-Dimensional Man was drafted, for which a 
hypothesis of underconsumption is not conducive to an emphasis upon a spiralling of 
unfulfilling needs (lest these be a vent for surplus). But, in addition, the US context in the 
middle of the post-war boom is also liable to have discouraged attention to the possibility of 
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crises and, despite, expanding economic and social wages, there are other absences such as 
the form and content taken by class relations and conflict.  
Indeed, there is an aura of suppression of both of the latter in deference to the nulling effects 
of ersatz consumerism. Instead, Marcuse readily acknowledges the tensions, resistances and 
struggles that, nonetheless, derive from opposition to the varieties of suppression that do 
inevitably arise. This is, however, to underplay the more organised and institutionalised 
forms of class relations, structures and conflicts and compromises that were characteristic of 
other countries during the postwar boom, let alone the rise of multinational corporations and 
the role of the state in facilitating corresponding national and international social and 
economic transformation and reproduction.  
The One Dimensions of Neoliberalism11 
And it is across the roles of the state and the global that the presence of the one-dimensional 
economy can be taken further, not least with the rise of neo-liberalism. For the last thirty 
years, alongside financialisation at its heart, has witnessed a transformed relationship 
between the state and the market, although this dualism is itself a fetishized form through 
which underlying economic, political and ideological interests are expressed, by no means 
representing a zero sum of more of one at the expense of the other. Rather than indicating the 
withdrawal of the state, neoliberalism has involved extensive intervention to promote private 
capital in general, and finance in particular, even if ideologically veiling this in terms of 
deference to market forces, a deceit that has been massively exposed by the support given to 
finance in the wake of the crisis (together with a rapidly evaporating anomie to financial 
rewards and loose re-regulation). 
Further, two loosely delineated phases of neoliberalism can be identified that can, across 
time, place and issue, be subject to shift, acceleration and/or overlaying. The first, 
appropriately dubbed “shock therapy” in the Latin American and post-Soviet adjustments 
runs primarily into the mid-1990s. It involves aggressive pursuit of the interests of private 
global capital, and of finance in particular, with limited regard to the dysfunctions that arise. 
Subsequently, the second phase, particularly associated with Third Wayism and the post 
Washington Consensus, is marked by some response to dysfunctions, including social 
conflicts to which they give rise, whilst continuing to sustain the financialisation of economic 
and social life.  
These two phases are also associated, respectively, with what has been termed the rolling 
back of the state followed by the rolling out of the state. In other words, the role (and one-
dimensional rolls) of the state has been transformed, not necessarily diminished, through 
financialised neoliberalism. This is notable not only in policy but also in the institutions 
through which policy is formed and implemented, not least with the increasing presence of 
private capital (through privatisation and public private partnerships) and commercialisation 
(user charges) and the corresponding institutionalised diminution of an already limited 
popular participation in delivery.  
An inevitable consequence of these developments is that outcomes under neoliberalism are 
highly diverse. On the one hand, the incidence and forms taken by financialisation are highly 
uneven as are the intensity and extent of its reach across both economic and social 
reproduction. On the other hand, given the degree of financialisation, how it interacts with 
such reproduction is itself contingent upon sphere of application and context. Not every 
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country had a subprime housing crisis, not every form of social provision, indeed very few 
beyond pensions, experienced such a crisis especially on such a grand scale. 
It is questionable whether such developments can be adequately captured in the Polanyian 
notion of double movement, Bayliss et al (2015) for further discussion. This is inadequate for 
homogenising within, and possibly across, finance, labour and land as each is deemed to be 
subject to a reaction against being increasingly commodified. How each of these is 
(re)commodified or decommodified is highly heterogeneous. In addition, such putative 
double movements are not confined to these three “commodities” alone but, potentially, 
across all areas of economic and social provision. 
Such movements are also heavily conditioned, if not determined, by the strength, balance and 
forms taken by class and other forms of conflict. Here, there are two crucial starting points to 
observe. First is that, if less in the USA which may have unduly influenced Marcuse’s 
outlook, the “Keynesian” period was marked by powerful trade unions and social democratic 
parties seeking reform and shared benefits of growth through negotiated compromises, what 
has been termed social compacting. Under neoliberalism, such compacting has been rolled 
back and, where rolled out, has taken on an entirely different character, namely limited in 
scope and confined to negotiating the austerities associated with adjustments. Significantly, 
unlike the developmental states, or East Asian Newly-Industrialised Countries, of the post-
war boom, such as South Korean, capitalist success did not depend, as it does today as 
exemplified by China, upon merely holding speculative finance in check as opposed to 
coordinating state-capital relations and incorporating or suppressing working class demands.  
Second is how striking is the failure of global capitalism, not only in its current crisis but also 
in its relatively poor pace of accumulation previously under the two phases of neoliberalism. 
This is despite what might be considered to have been the most favourable circumstances for 
global capitalism across almost every criterion. There has been an unprecedented availability 
of new technologies, the decline in strength, organisation and aspirations of working class 
and liberation movements, the curtailment of economic and social wages (no one blames 
these for the crisis although their reduction is perceived as  necessary to resolve the crisis), a 
corresponding triumph of neoliberal policies more generally, an unprecedented increase in 
the capitalist global labour force with developments in China, in international migration and 
female labour market participation, and victory in the Cold War ushering in the new world 
order. 
In this light, neoliberalism appears in some respects to offer a negative photographic image, 
not a negation, of Marcuse’s one dimension. Far from guaranteeing stability, capitalist 
accumulation has faltered despite, even in part because of, consumer-led aspirations 
underpinned by credit. This is not the consequence of the strength of protest and conflict but 
of its relative absence (as is evident in the response to the crisis and the failure for 
alternatives successfully to emerge even in the presence of bourgeois hegemony). On the 
other hand, the diversities and unevenness of neoliberalism have spawned a multitude of 
conflicts and resistances arising out of deprivations and unfulfilled aspirations within the 
confines of One-Dimensional Man. In short, p. 256: 
the struggle for the solution has outgrown the traditional forms. The totalitarian 
tendencies of the one-dimensional society renders the traditional ways and means of 
protest ineffective – perhaps even dangerous because they preserve the illusion of 
popular sovereignty. 
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For Marcuse, immediately continuing, and at the point in time when financialisation and 
neoliberalism were about to reverse the narrowing of inequality: 
This illusion contains some truth: “the people”, previously the ferment of social 
change, have “moved up” to become the ferment of social cohesion. Here rather than 
in the redistribution of wealth and equalization of classes is the new stratification 
characteristic of advanced industrial society. (emphasis added). 
Reference to industrial society again occurs at the cusp of the origins of financialisation. By 
the new stratification, Marcuse refers to the “substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the 
exploited and persecuted of other races and colors, the unemployed and the unemployable”. 
To them is attributed, “Their force is behind every political demonstration for the victims of 
law and order”, p. 257. Nonetheless: 
Nothing indicates that it will be a good end. The economic and technical capabilities 
of the established societies are sufficiently vast to allow for adjustments and 
concessions to the underdog, and their armed forces sufficiently trained and equipped 
to take care of emergency situations. 
Such is a mixed anticipation of neoliberalism, with allowance now needing to be made that 
the ferment of social inclusion is increasingly one of exclusion or variegated vulnerabilities, 
that underdog and dog have more rather than less shared experiences of deprivation, the 
power of the industrial is incorporated with the financial, and the totalitarian has rendered 
protest as much strangled and displaced as it is ineffective. 
Economics 
From One-Dimensioning of Marginalism … 
Such sets the scene for the portrayal of mainstream economics and its multiplicity of one 
dimensions. Indeed, the discipline in its orthodoxy offers an ideal and bountiful illustration of 
Marcuse’s hypothesis. This is a consequence of its overwhelming enthusiasm for reflecting 
and embracing in scholarship the fetishisms attached to commodification, commodity form 
and commodity calculation. It all begins, at least in its extreme form, with the marginalist 
revolution of the 1870s that witnessed the displacement of the classical, and/or class, political 
economy - of the likes of Smith, Ricardo and Marx - by the optimising individuals of what 
was to become neoclassical economics.12 In short, one-dimensional reliance on 
methodological individualism came to the fore with the marginalist revolution, and the 
dimensions of that individual were even further reduced to the utility maximising calculus of 
homo economicus.  
This did not happen all at once. Indeed, from the 1870s, to the 1950s, one part of the 
discipline dedicated itself to extracting the fullest possible deductive implications from 
assuming optimising individuals. By setting itself this goal, what was to become 
microeconomics systematically if unwittingly began to one-dimension itself. The reason was 
that anything that got in the way of deriving supply and demand curves, of how quantities on 
the market respond to prices, simply had to be assumed away or, in other words, squashed 
flat.  
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Thus, the eponymous notion of utility (function) departed a more rounded, many-dimensional 
understanding of individual well-being and became identified with a simple product of what 
could be consumed through access to goods purchased through the market (together with the 
disutility of effort and time lost due to work in return for the wage).13 Moreover, even such 
utility functions were required to be fixed – no systematic consumer demand if preferences 
are allowed to change at all for whatever reason. The implication is that individuals are 
themselves one-dimensional not only in their motivation of utility maximisation but also in 
their very identity and capacity to make their own identity and for it to be able to evolve. 
Individuals and their utility are one and the same, and the pursuit of the latter by the former is 
indistinguishable from the actions of an automaton.  
Whilst the theory of value based on (marginal) utility is known as a subjective because it 
comes from the preferences of individuals, it is a heavily crushed subjectivity in that those 
individuals have no choice or reflection over what they are. And, by the same token, the 
nature of the goods themselves is reduced to the single dimension of contributing to utility. 
They can only be defined by their physical properties as opposed to their socially constructed 
and endowed meanings, let alone how these are reflected upon and internalised by the 
individual consumer. 
Exactly the same reductionism applies to the realm of production. This, in the equally 
ubiquitous production function, is seen simply as a relationship between physically defined 
inputs and outputs, a technical relationship once again, stripped of any reference to the social 
relations of production. Moreover, technology is taken as given so that the more or less 
unproblematic buying of inputs and the selling of outputs suffices to specify the equally one-
dimensional role assumed by the capitalist.  
In short, in order to set up what can be termed its technical apparatus of utility and production 
functions, the theory simply discarded any inconveniences whether they be conceptual, 
methodological, otherwise unavoidable determinants, and even claims to realism and 
commonsense. It was equally necessary to isolate the analysis of supply and demand on the 
market from dimensions such as the social, political, ideological or institutional factor, and 
from the influence of social determinants such as collective conflict and the exercise of 
power. Individuals simply went about their business of buying and selling in pursuit of 
harmonised self-interest. They increasingly did so in an economics that was further one-
dimensioned by consolidating its separation from the other social sciences that in turned 
incorporated a richer set of methods, theories and concepts. 
With such a technical apparatus in place by the end of the 1930s, thereby creating a sort of 
implosion upon the calculus of homo economicus, ambitions were widened to allow for the 
apparatus to be extended to understand the workings of the economy as a whole in what 
became known as general equilibrium theory, the bringing together of the supplies and 
demands of all individuals. Here the pinnacle of achievement in formal mathematical terms 
was realised in the 1950s, as the existence, uniqueness and stability of the workings of the 
economic system as a whole were demonstrated (albeit under extraordinarily restrictive 
conditions on its own terms). This gave rise to what can be termed a technical architecture to 
complement the technical apparatus, one in which the economy as a whole is perceived in 
terms of the narrowly defined efficiency of its putative equilibrium.14 
Whilst the emergence of this technical apparatus and architecture was anticipated by Lionel 
Robbins in the early 1930s in defining economics as the allocation of scarce resources 
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between competing ends,15 it evolved alongside and, initially, as a junior partner to both the 
newly emerging Keynesianism and the more longstanding economic history and the old 
institutional, Veblenesque-style, economics that focused, respectively, on the putatively 
distinct short- and long-run movements of the economy as a whole. What these shared in 
common, but not with microeconomics was a variety of systemic approaches, which were 
seen almost as second nature as essential both to address the most immediate problems posed 
by the Great Depression and to draw lessons from its historical origins and its antecedents. 
… Through the Formalist Revolution and Economics Imperialism … 
In short, the one dimensions of economics as it evolved in the post war period constituted a 
fourfold division across macroeconomics, microeconomics, a bundle of applied and 
empirically driven fields, and a corresponding detachment from non-market relations and 
other social sciences. Initially, macroeconomics took precedence over microeconomics as the 
leading field in deference to Keynesianism but, following what was called the formalist 
revolution of the 1950s, the mathematical methods of microeconomics increasingly held 
sway over macroeconomics as well. This shared method in theory and presentation, purported 
to elevate economics to the status of a physical science (whilst, through commitment to what 
was termed, positive economics being blissfully ignorant of debates around the scientific 
method) and equally had the effect of marginalising the status of other applied and empirical 
fields whilst, at least, allowing them a degree of independence in view of being unsuited to 
the core methods. Such was true of fields like development, public, industrial and regional 
economics. Significantly, the exception that proves the rule, something termed welfare 
economics, was perceived to be limited to propositions derivable from the technical apparatus 
and architecture, and subject to allowing for an unquestioned Pareto efficiency, explicitly 
deemed to be deliberately devoid of any ethical content outside the domain of positive 
economics. 
Nonetheless, the seeds of change had already been sown within this configuration of 
dimensions. For, paradoxically, despite the implosion to a technical apparatus, of utility and 
production functions, within microeconomics, being rationalised by the notion of solely 
studying one sort of economic behaviour solely in the context of market supply and demand, 
the principles that emerged proved to be logically unlimited in their scope of application. 
After all, maximising utility or outputs from inputs has nothing as such to do with the market. 
So black holing rather one-dimensioning the economy had the paradoxical effect of opening 
the prospect of a big bang for microeconomics across both economics itself and the social 
sciences more generally (the latter being termed economics imperialism). It gave rise to what 
has been termed the historical logic of imperialism. Historically, the technical apparatus and 
architecture of microeconomics could only be established by confining itself to supply and 
demand on the market, and by discarding all methods, theories, concepts and realism (or 
dimensions of dimensions) with which it was incompatible. But, logically, the outcome was a 
theory that was of universal applicability (eg individuals maximise utility irrespective of 
time, place, issue and context) and not confined to the market. The scene was set for a 
redrawing of the dimensions confining microeconomics to market supply and demand on the 
basis of individual behaviour, perversely,  paradoxically and inconsistently precisely by 
bringing back in, if selectively, those elements that had been  black holed to establish the 
technical content in the first place.   
The effect was felt immediately in three areas in particular: the economics of education in 
which the latter was reduced to the single dimension of costs and (waged) benefits of 
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schooling, training and other sources of skills; public choice theory in which the choice 
between war and peace was reduced explicitly to the same dimension as choice between 
apples and pears; and the new economic history for which, typical for this first phase of 
economics imperialism, major change was reduced to the dimension of self-interest and 
profitability as if conducted through perfectly working markets, as applied to explain the 
abolition of slavery. To hammer home the point for the last example, techniques for 
economic analysis were established by setting aside power, conflict, collective endeavour, 
even meaning (of slavery for example to those struggling over it) in order to argue why such 
issues arose as slavery was overthrown in pursuit of self-interest! The point is not that self-
interest counts for nothing but that it cannot be one-dimensioned to fixed individual utility 
functions. Shall I eat an apple or a pear, shall I fight in the US Civil War and, if so, on which 
side? 
… To Neoliberalisation 
But the one-dimensional designs of such economics imperialism had to wait upon the end of 
the post-war boom, and the discrediting of Keynesianism with the stagflation of the 1970s to 
make significant progress beyond the initial stars of economics imperialism. It witnessed not 
only the triumph of monetarism over Keynesianism but, less observed and possibly even 
more important, the triumph of microeconomics over macroeconomics, with the leading 
monetarist taking over the mantle from Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas, even declaring that 
macroeconomics is superfluous. This not only underpinned the familiar austerity programmes 
associated with neoliberalism but also policies of privatisation, deregulation and so on,  
together with an extraordinary reduction in dimensions of analysis even on its own terms. 
Thus, economic models were wont to rely upon single, so-called representative households 
and firms, to deny the state could play any role other than shifting supply and demand curves 
(with even these actions tending to be neutralised and ineffective by countervailing responses 
by the optimising household anticipating higher inflation or taxes as a result), that short-run 
change took place around pre-determined long-run paths (or equilibrium), and that other 
institutionalised aspects of modern capitalism, such as multinational corporations, the modern 
financial system and the system of industrial relations, at most constituted epiphenomena that 
could distort the perfect workings of the market. 
The overall result, then, was to reconfigure the one-dimensions of the discipline with a 
further marginalisation of the mixed methods associated with the applied fields as well as 
their increasing subordination to the one dimensions of microeconomics in particular as it 
brought them within its deductive grasp. Such developments, though, have already taken us a 
decade or so past the time of writing of One-Dimensional Man and, to the extent that 
Marcuse took account of economics there, he would presumably have taken more interest in 
the continuing, what we would now call, heterodox traditions of which the unhelpful 
monopoly capital school, and the more supportive institutionalism of JK Galbraith could have 
caught his attention.16  
Such have now become the debris from the big bang of economics imperialism. Following 
the monetarist (and microeconomic) counter-revolution against Keynesianism (and applied 
traditions), the discipline as a whole focused upon the neoliberal one-dimension of state 
versus market. With neo-liberal scholarship veiling both a reality of heavy intervention to 
promote private capital in general and finance in particular, as well as an authoritarian role 
for the state in guaranteeing the supposedly free play of markets, the result was to inspire a 
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corresponding reaction against such dogma in the realm of markets by spawning a new one-
dimension of market imperfections.  
In contrast to the first phase of economics imperialism, in which the non-market was one-
dimensioned by treating it as if were a perfectly working market, the second phase one-
dimensions by reducing the non-market to the rational,  possibly even collectively organised, 
response to,  possibly correction of, market imperfections. Thus, all non-market relations, 
most notably the state and other institutions, and customary, habitual and even apparently 
irrational behaviour are deemed to exist and have effects because markets work imperfectly 
as opposed, for example, being seen as deeply rooted in, if not determined by, the class 
relations underpinning economic, political and ideological outcomes. Without wishing to 
embrace at all the performativity thesis – economics makes the economy rather than 
(primarily if indirectly and mediated) vice-versa – there is a striking parallel with Marcuse’s 
attention to the “rationalization of the irrational” as far as economics as industrial society and 
the technology of models is concerned, for, p.  234: 
 
Industrial society possesses the instrumentalities for transforming the metaphysical 
into the physical, the inner into the outer, the adventures of the mind into adventures 
of technology.  
Consequently, the second phase of economics imperialism has been far more wide-ranging, 
virulent and successful, inspiring or revitalising a whole new galaxy, not a few stars and 
comets, of one-dimensional fields such as new growth theory, new institutional economics, 
new economic sociology, new welfare economics, new economic history, the new economic 
geography and the new development economics,17 again both bringing back in factors that 
had to be excluded to establish the technical apparatus, and yet deploying that apparatus to 
explain and reincorporate them.18 To continue with the metaphor borrowed from Marcuse 
and applied to economics, p. 17: 
Containment of technical progress goes hand in hand with its growth in the 
established direction … The most advanced areas of industrial society exhibit 
throughout these two features: a trend toward consummation of technological 
rationality, and intensive efforts to contain this trend within the established 
institutions. 
Further, the extreme monetarism of the 1970s eventually gave way, in the most modest of 
concessions to a diluted renewal of Keynesianism, to the so-called New Consensus 
Macroeconomic, in which it was accepted that some non-financial markets might not work 
perfectly but that central bank manipulation of the interest rate was deemed more or less to be 
both the only effective policy instrument and yet sufficient to guarantee stability. 
 Unsurprisingly, the current global crisis, and the failure of such policy through quantitative 
easing and practically zero interest rates, has left the discipline not only accused of failing to 
anticipate the crisis but, equally, even of being able to explain let alone remedy it in 
retrospect. Whilst, in the real world, after paper and temporary excoriation of the bankers, 
and the restoration of their profitability and minimal reregulation, policy has fallen back to 
the default neoliberal stance of austerity. One-dimensioned economics, having reduced itself 
to a few equations totally remote from the processes of financialised economic and social 
reproduction, has proven incapable of incorporating any plausible response to its transparent 
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failings. Yet, it appeared to have nowhere to go in reconstructing rather than totally 
destroying itself. 
And the Economics of Everything and the Everything of Economics 
But, fools rush in where angels fear to tread just as hope springs eternal, and, even before the 
crisis, economics imperialism had entered a third phase, reconfiguring its one-dimensions. 
For, in the earlier phases, the optimising individual reigns supreme whether in the one-
dimensional domains of perfect or imperfect markets, and no allowance is made for 
alternative motives or forms of behaviour (even the rejected bounded rationality of Herbert 
Simon). Otherwise, bringing back in other dimensions, other than on its own reduced terms, 
would both undermine the derivation of the technical apparatus itself and raise doubts over its 
coherence and range of application. But, so secure had the discipline become in its core 
principles, so inured to incoherence and inconsistency across methodological, theoretical and 
conceptual practices so long as they clung to mathematical forms, and so promiscuous in 
application of those principles and practices, that it soon became second nature to add 
whatever fitted to the latter, or could be plundered, from across social science as a whole. 
Economics has literally become, as one book title puts it, The Economics of Almost 
Everything, although most popularly as Freakonomics.19 
Such has characterised the current phase of economics imperialism with, for example, 
behavioural economics to the fore, or what might be termed economic rationality plus.20 The 
only other dimension not covered in this account so far has been the prodigious expansion of 
empirical methods, or econometrics, not least made possible through the availability of large 
data sets and the generalised computing power to access and manipulate them. This is 
presumed to allow theories to be tested and parameters of adjustment to be estimated, 
reflecting a continuing commitment to falsifiability. But it has served more to accelerate the 
scope and reach of theory by at most casual theoretical justification for models estimated, 
whilst reinforcing the extension of such statistical methods to study the relations across as 
many variables as data availability allows. For Marcuse, p. 169: 
scientific thought  … outside the physical sciences assumes the form of a pure and 
self-contained formalism (symbolism) on the one hand, and a total empiricism on the 
other … barriers which prevent this empiricism from coming to grips with reality, and 
establishing (or rather re-establishing) the concepts which may break these barriers. 
He might well have had mainstream economics in mind! 
Whether, then, through theoretical or empirical work, economics has ranged far and wide 
across the social sciences. It has targeted a widening scope of application upon the basis of an 
extraordinarily narrow and unjustifiable set of principles, even if these have been marginally 
and opportunistically expanded in its latest phase of economics imperialism. This has led to 
competing interpretations over what is the nature of the discipline and what is its prospects. 
For some it is defined purely by its mathematical methods, for others it is disintegrating as a 
result of its incorporation of untraditional elements from the other social sciences. My own 
view is different, as laid out here, with new one-dimensions being added to those that are 
longstanding and privileged, one dimensioning more and more social science in the process.  
These developments are indicative of the simultaneous strength and weakness of mainstream 
economics. Its one-dimensional strength lies in the near monopoly that it holds over the 
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discipline. It allows for no alternatives and continues to squeeze and exclude those that might 
offer them. Its weakness is multi-dimensional, reflecting its corresponding lack of intellectual 
integrity. This is evident not only in its contempt for, and lack of willingness to allow, let 
alone debate with, alternatives, but also in its studied ignorance of the history of thought of 
itself as a discipline, methodology, and interdisciplinarity beyond its own imperialist designs.  
Consequently, the weaknesses are subject to being exposed in two ways. On the one hand, 
there is the discipline’s lack of correspondence to, and inability to explain unavoidable 
economic realities, from the implausibility of its starting point in homo economicus to major 
events such as the global crisis, from the atom to the universe. On the other hand, partly in its 
attempt to compensate for its inability to explain the economy on its own limited terms, there 
is its exposure to alternative methods, theories and conceptualisations as it extends its scope 
across the other social sciences and non-economic topics, revealing both the narrowness and 
lack of plausibility and suitability of its own principles.  
Conclusions 
 
In summary, the simplest manner in which to specify the one-dimensionings of mainstream 
economics is by reference to the fetishisms by which the supply and demand of things upon 
the market is the starting point for dividing the market from the non-market. Within the 
market, capital is initially fetishistically perceived as a thing with general productive 
capacities that can ultimately deliver utility. But, corresponding principles of production of 
things becomes extended into the production of anything for the equally extended one-
dimensional satisfaction of utility. In the first instance, this involves the fetishistic invention 
of other forms of physical capital, such as human, natural and environmental capital.  
21Such is the one-dimensioning of the economy by economics. Subsequently, the one-
dimensioning has been extrapolated to the non-market, to society, both to enrich an otherwise 
inexplicable economy itself (“institutions matter” as Nobel Prize-winner Douglas North 
precociously declared) and to facilitate this, other fetishised capitals can be invented, such as 
social capital,22 to fill out the non-economic. In other words, a fetishised notion of capital is 
imposed on what are not capital relations, as if everything is capital-like, just as previously it 
was seen that everything could become money-like. Such social capital, outside of the 
market, is the alter ego of the new institutional economics, for which institutions serve as a 
generic, umbrella term for everything that is not the market, detached from capital, even if 
interacting with it.23 
In this light, both economy and economics have transformed considerably since the drafting 
of One-Dimensional Man. The Keynesian period seemed to have bred the illusion of the end 
to the crises of capitalism if only by degrading economic and social lives, and the ideologies 
to which they were attached. Since then, though, there have been two major crises. Whilst the 
first, in the wake of the monetarist counter-revolution, brought about a major change in both 
economy and economics, promoting financialisation and successive forms of economics 
imperialism, the second has as yet witnessed no major realignments, apart from the collapse 
of the Soviet bloc, the continuing rise of China, and the explicit and sharpening division of 
the EU into core and periphery in the wake of the current crisis (observe how aglobal is 
Marcuse’s analysis at one extreme, and subject to being undifferentiated by old let alone new 
social movements, at the other). In parallel to the real world, the academic universe of 
mainstream economics has changed both rapidly and extensively but without in some 
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respects having changed at all other than in one-dimensioning across more variables and a 
wider scope of application. Plus ça change, toujours la même chose. 
In this respect, orthodoxy enjoyed and consolidated its hold over the discipline at the expense 
of heterodoxy whilst, in what has been termed the first phase of neoliberalism reaching into 
the early 1990s, the other social sciences tended peremptorily to dismiss this intellectual 
barbarism whilst focusing its attention and promoting an entirely different form of individual 
subjectivity with the rise of postmodernism. It critically celebrated self-reflexivity - as 
opposed to proffering the immutably fixed identities and corresponding preferences within 
and without the domain of the market as understood by mainstream economics – and, to 
parody, a simulacrum of one-dimensions.  
In short, these two avenues reflect orthogonal one-dimensioning of the social sciences, 
entirely compatible with one another and, essentially, two sides of the same coin although 
embossed with entirely different images and content. Both have evolved during the second 
phase of neoliberalism, as previously delineated above for economics and, in parallel, as 
varieties of postpostmodernisms have taken their turn in tossing the coin. But they have also 
been much more contested than in the first phase of neoliberalism by a radical scholarship 
that has grown in the second phase of neoliberalism in what might broadly be termed the 
material culture of contemporary capitalism, in which political economy as opposed to 
economics is a key component and object of study in its own right. This development has 
been prompted by close attention to the realities of neoliberalism, globalisation and their 
interactions, with a renewed impetus deriving from the global crisis and its unavoidable 
consequences, however much these themselves are subject to competing interpretations and 
reinterpretations. In addition, the process has been accelerated by the global crisis, not least in 
the demand from students in reaction against mainstream economics and that space be given, 
under the label of pluralism, to the acknowledgement let alone the teaching of alternatives. 
However, whatever the strength of such initiatives, and their partnership with those more 
generally engaged in heterodox political economy, which is mushrooming across the social 
sciences, the prospects for alternatives within scholarship depend first and foremost upon the 
successful pursuit of alternatives within the economy itself, and their interaction with 
scholarship. 
In the interim, there is an essential responsibility on radical scholars to avoid both Oscar 
Wilde’s sentimentalism and cynicism and to expose one-dimensioning, whether it be of 
housing or health, or the new institutional economics or the new economic geography as 
playthings of the latest phase of economics imperialism. For, each of these is differentiated in 
how they are flattened in ways that reflect deep attachments to the systemic tensions of which 
they are a product. It is the virtue of One-Dimensional Man to have exposed one-
dimensioning but it would be a vice to succumb to its subtler charms and treat the world of 
financialised neoliberalism as if all real or imagined things were just another coke. 
 
 Footnotes
1 My own preference is for “Zombieconomics”, Fine (2010b). 
2 Ritzer (1993 and 2003). 
3 See Fine and Leopold (1990 and 1993) and Fine (2002 and 2013) 
4 See Fine (2002) and, most recently, Bayliss et al (2013) and Fine (2013a). 
5 See Fine and Saad-Filho (2010) for an account. 
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6 See Christophers (2013). 
7 See Fine (2013c and 2014). 
8 See Lapavitsas (2013). 
9 Drawing upon Bayliss (2013). 
10 Although note that one of the earliest accounts of the rising significance of finance comes 
from Magdoff and Sweezy (1987). 
11 For discussion of neoliberalism along lines suggested here, see Fine (2012) and Bayliss et 
al (2015). 
12 But note that the one-dimensional fetishism of deductivism and the reduction of (labour) 
value to its price form is heavily characteristic of Ricardo (if, at least, attracting Marx’s praise 
as bourgeois, as opposed to vulgar, political economy par excellence for retaining labour as 
the source of value).  
13 Thereby also crushing the inextricable link with the ethical content of economic analysis 
and insisting upon a separation between positive and normative economics, see Fine (2013b). 
14 The notions of technical apparatus and architecture derive from Al-Jazaeri (2008) and can 
be abbreviated as TA2. 
15 Robbins (1932). 
16 Although a Keynesian, significantly, his major works were entitled The Affluent Society, 
The New Industrial Estate, The Anatomy of Power, and so on. To some degree, though, the 
monopoly capital school does see the creation and manipulation of false needs as a response 
to realisation problems. 
17 The difference between the first and second phases of economics imperialism is neatly 
expressed in the shift from the Washington Consensus (and Ann Krueger’s rent seeking) to 
the post Washington Consensus (and Joe Stiglitz’s asymmetric information, market 
imperfection economics), leading me to propose the formula SS=E=MI2; social 
science=economics=methodological individualism x market imperfections. See Bayliss et al 
(eds) (2011). 
18 A particularly revealing illustration is the use of identity-less utility functions to explain 
individual choice of identity, thereby assuming a given (narrow) identity to explain identity 
and one-dimensioning the nature and origins of identity, Fine (2009). 
19 Frank (2007) and Levitt and Dubny (2005). 
20 This takes extreme and bizarre form in the rapidly growing field of neuroeconomics, the 
idea that the economy can be derived from brain science, at least in some sense at a deeper 
level than the optimising individual. See Fine (2011, Appendix). 
21  
22 Of course, social capital is the one-dimensioning of social science and social relations as a 
whole, with a significant presence in economics, but nothing as compared to other 
disciplines. See Fine (2001 and 2010a). 
23 As observed by Fine and Milonakis (2003), the one-dimensioning of institutions begins 
with the pricing of principle as in North’s new institutional economics. 
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